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Absolute Truth: 
or How to Live with the Natives 
without Going Relativist 
LLOYD REINHARDT' 
Abraham Lincoln was once standing by a donkey, talking to 
another politician. The conversation at one point went like this: 
Sir, how many legs does this donkey have? 
Four, Mr. Lincoln. 
And how many tails does it have? 
Why, just one, Mr. Lincoln. 
Now, sir, what if we were to call the tail a leg; how 
many legs would the donkey have then? 
Five, Mr. Lincoln. 
No sir, for you cannot make a tail into a leg by calling it 
one. 
In some years of using this dialogue in classrooms, 1 have found it 
causes disagreement among students. Occasionally 1 have taken 
votes. 1 wish 1 had been doing this for many more years and kept 
records. It would have been a barometer of the spread of the dark 
clouds of relativism. In recent years the vote generally goes against 
Lincoln. 
The most obvious feature of truth and objectivity is that, 
whatever the subject matter, saying or thinking something does not 
make it so. Something independent of thought or statement deter-
mines whether what is thought or said is so. But there is a signi-
ficant group of exceptions to that; and 1 must mention them only to 
set them aside. Standing before the altar or before the town clerk 
and saying 'I do' or 'I will' is not describing my marriage, it is 
*Lloyd Reinhardt is a senior lecturer in Traditional and Modern Philosophy 
and a compulsive seeker after truth. 
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perpetrating it. Similarly saying the words' I promise' can make it 
true that I have promised. It is the umpire saying 'Out' or making 
some equivalent bodily gesture, which makes it true that you are 
out. In such cases, saying does make what is said so. These aside, 
I will proceed. 
Truth and objectivity are bound up with what philosophers call 
the problem of 'the reality of the external world'. But it is worth 
mentioning, just to set it aside too, that mathematics is clearly an 
inquiry in which saying does not make things so; but it is prob-
lematic what the status of the things talked about is. Oversimply 
put, there is debate about whether mathematics is invention or 
discovery. I doubt if anybody in this debate would try to maintain 
that numbers are there like Everest is. Even so, that species of 
philosopher called 'Platonist' might say numbers are there in a far 
superior way. So there is a debate about that; but I am not going to 
say any more about it here. All would agree that numbers do not 
have natural histories like animal species, mountain ranges and 
plants, rivers and glaciers. 
I used the well-known phrase 'the reality of the external 
world'. I do not like that phrase. It evokes a picture of our mind 
and consciousness as inside and the rest outside. This is a distortion 
of the nature of the relations between us and the rest of the world. It 
is a picture the Oxford philosopher, Gilbert Ryle, denigrated as 
being of a ghost in a machine. Its most recent version stems from 
Descartes but has earlier roots; it has a long history because it 
speaks to something almost certainly universal in human life. 
Wittgenstein thought it a picture which not only distorts under-
standing of our relations to the rest of the world; it also produces a 
diseased understanding of our inner or spiritual lives. It is part of 
what Wittgenstein called 'a picture which holds us captive'. 
The picture has been more or less superseded by an image that 
is much trendier. This picture, which now holds many Australian 
and other philosophers captive, is that of the brain in a vat. It is 
manipulated by a computer program so that it will have the ex-
periences we have, acquire the beliefs, feel the emotions and 
desires, tile loves an.d hates, form L'1e intentions and aims that we 
do, etc. It will be just like it is, but it won't be really. We are, in 
this horrendous vision, systematically deluded in our beliefs that we 
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are (complete) human bodies, and that there are other people. But 
dispute with the proponents of this neo-Cartesian vision-a vision 
that calls itself modem materialism, identifying our minds with our 
brains-is not my concern here, though some of what I say at the 
end will bear on this image. Anyway the materialists do not say 
things are like that; they only think it important to say that they 
could be; that has never diminished my distaste for taking the 
picture seriously. But enough of that. Proponents of this image and 
I are in agreement about the points I have so far made about 
objectivity and truth. And so we agree on such things as that the 
solar system and the galaxy were here before us and before any 
sentient life was here; and we are in agreement that plant life and 
geological activity went on on the earth before there was any 
sentience or any consciousness here; and we are in agreement that, 
unless the nuclear disaster we dread goes even further than we 
expect, much plant life and geological activity, even if no human 
life, will continue to go on. 
My aim is to give the reader a glimpse of the current struggle 
over the idea of things being as they are whether we know it or not, 
whether we like it or not, and even whether we have developed, in 
our thought and our language, conceptions of how things possibly 
are or are not. Here is another philosopher speaking of the dark 
clouds of relativism: 
If the people who share a civilization are no longer on the 
whole convinced that the fonn of life which it tries to 
realize is worth realizing, nothing can save it. If 
European civilization is a civilization based on the belief 
that truth is the most precious thing in the world and that 
pursuing it is the whole duty of man, an irrationalist 
epidemic, if it ran through Europe, unchecked, would in 
a relatively short time destroy everything that goes by the 
name of European civilization. 1 
I have reservations about Collingwood's talk of 'the whole duty of 
man'. But bad enough if truth and its pursuit are not among the 
most important things in our civilization. 
1R. G. Collingwood, An Essay on Metaphysics, Oxford, 1940, p. 140. 
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Others, far less attractive to me than Collingwood, speak of 
faith in our civilization, our Christian civilization, of faith in God; 
and of how the loss of that faith will lead us into barbarism and 
chaos. Perhaps their concern and Collingwood's are connected. 
There is some connexion; for I think that philosophy has a task of 
providing a conception of reality as independently determining 
whether our thoughts and assertions are true or false; but a 
conception is needed which does not, covertly or overtly, fall back 
on the notion of God and a God's-eye view. God is dead, as 
Nietzche said; and as Bernard Williams says, we ought to write his 
obituary and distribute his legacies.2 
Where does the God's-eye view come into my discussion? It is 
a matter of supposing that truth and objectivity involve a point of 
view outside all our local points of view; that without such a 
viewpoint it is improper to speak of truth and objectivity. By 'local' 
I mean something historical and something relating to various ways 
of living on the contemporary surface of the earth. We should even 
think of life on earth as local because of the increasing fashion-
ability (and conceivable truth) of the idea that there is intelligent life 
elsewhere in the galaxy or the universe. There is a temptation, in 
trying to formulate a conception of reality that meets this require-
ment of objectivity, to use the idea of an ideal observer, a knowing 
being who stands outside all our points of view. To do this is to 
extrapolate from such cases as that of the several blind men feeling 
an elephant and offering conflicting views as to what sort of thing it 
is. A sighted person watching and listening to the proceedings will 
be able to understand the differences among the reports of the blind 
men. In a dubious extrapolation, the elephant is the totality of 
reality, the blind men are various points of view, and the sighted 
observer, outside the whole show, is God. But to keep relying on 
such extrapolation in order to be confident about the possibility of 
objectivity is a kind of epistemological necrophilia. I shall later 
speak of some of what is involved in gaining a conception of 
objectivity that spares us the burden of the God's-eye view. But, 
before that, more about relativism. 
I use the word 'truforism' for this relativism, and 'truforist' for 
2Bernard Williams, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy. London. 1985. 
p.33. 
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a supporter of it. I naturally hope that the barbarousness of the 
terms will discourage those they apply to from continuing in their 
ways. It is not rare to find in much conversation, and in many 
classrooms, the words 'true for us' or 'true for them', or 'true for 
Eskimos' or 'true for Buddhists', etc. Naturally, then, also 'true for 
me'; the end of this miserable journey is solipsism, the ludicrous 
idea that, for all I know, all there is to reality is myself and how the 
course of my sensory experience goes. 
Among social anthropologists, at least according to one of the 
most distinguished of current ones, there is much talk of peoples 
who 'live in different worlds'. Dan Sperber writes: 
In pre-relativist anthropology, Westerners thought of 
themselves as superior to all other people. Relativism 
replaced this despicable hierarchical gap by a kind of 
cognitive apartheid. If we cannot be superior in the same 
world, let each people live in its own world.3 
If we take the idea of living in different worlds seriously, we must 
be puzzled by our ability adversely to affect the lives of other 
peoples, up to outright killing of them in large numbers. But if 
'living in separate worlds' is just hyperbole for the banality 
involved in such thoughts as that the world of the actor is a different 
world from the world of the politician, it ought clearly to be 
acknowledged that nothing much is being claimed. (Some of us 
wish acting and politics were separate enough to have prevented an 
actor from influencing politics as much as one recently did.) 
An initial response to relativist truforism is that of my colleague 
David Stove. If 'It is true for them' means anything more than 
'They believe it' what exactly is the more that it means? This is a 
good response. For there is an obvious difficulty about making 
sense out of 'it is true for them; but it is not true'; while there is no 
difficulty at all about making sense out of 'They believe it; but it is 
not true.' It is common as rain to be able to say 'It's raining, but 
they don't believe it' or 'It's not raining, but they think it is'. 
3Dan Sperber, 'Apparently Irrational Beliefs', Rationality and Relativism, 
ed. M. Hollis and S. Lukes, Oxford, 1984, 179-80 
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Truforism is not new. It started in (at least) ancient Greece; and 
Plato tackled it vigorously as it was espoused by Protagoras. In its 
current outbreak it is probably largely a product of the spread of 
European civilization over the earth, with the attendant uprooting of 
civilizations older than itself and of traditional (what used to be 
called 'primitive') cultures. We are paying a heavy price for this 
often callous uprooting and there is no telling where it is all going to 
end. Sympathy for the people involved and concern about our 
crimes against them is widespread among members of our own 
civilization; and it is especially strong in many of the sensitive and 
intelligent young, such as my students. I do not, could not, despise 
this sympathy and this concern. Further, it goes with a commonly 
found idea that the very ways of living we have uprooted may be 
sources of enlightenment for us, either because we can better 
appreciate ourselves through comparisons or, dubiously, through 
attempts to adopt as our attitudes, attitudes those ways of life are 
informed by: in particular there is much interest in the attitudes 
toward the natural environment displayed by many traditional 
peoples. Adopting such attitudes toward nature (assuming we can 
even make sense of them) and doing so because we think it would 
help deter us from environmental vandalism is futile, even silly. 
These are not live options for us. And their not being live options 
very likely diminishes our ability clearly to understand them. This 
does not mean there is no point in the effort to do so. But trying to 
adopt the attitudes is rather like going to church on Sunday because 
you have decided that religion is needed as a kind of social cement. 
That is hardly a religious attitude even if it is true that, historically, 
religion has, in part, functioned as social cement 
I said I could not despise the sympathy and concern caused by 
our uprooting of other cultures. But how can we accommodate that 
concern without condescension and without lapsing into or being 
tolerant of truforism? For it deserves no sympathy whatsoever. 
A start is to develop David Stove's point further. Instead of just 
insisting on being told of a difference between 'It's true for them' 
and 'They believe it' , let us go further and notice these points: first, 
it is possible rationally to believe what is false. Second, it is 
possible irrationally to believe what is true. We can say, in many 
cases, 'They believe it; it is not at all surprising that they believe it 
given their life, environment and history; it is even justifiable on 
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their part to believe as they do. Nevertheless they are mistaken.' A 
famous example will help to make this clear. 
It is not true (though lots of people seem to believe it) that 
everybody believed that the earth was flat until relatively recent 
times. Nearly everybody who was moderately educated, in, say, 
the fifteenth century, knew that the earth was round; what they 
believed that was false was that the sun revolved daily around the 
earth, a proposition of the best theory of the day, the Ptolemaic 
theory. Even so, Aristarchus, in ancient Greece, preceded 
Copernicus in theorizing that the earth revolved around the sun and 
that it rotated on its axis. His reasoning and his evidence for this 
were very good. Sadly, Aristotle said this theory had to be wrong. 
And he said so reasonably. His argument was that if Aristarchus 
was right, we couldn't stand up on the surface of the earth; the 
fierce wind due to the rotation would blow us away. Even after 
Gali1eo did much to support Copernicus's theory, it was not 
irrational to reject it. For, among other things, there was the 
problem of the stellar parallax. The fixed stars do not change their 
appearance to the naked eye during the year; nor to very powerful 
telescopes. To appreciate this point, think of a picket fence about a 
block long which you drive past at a distance of, say, 50 metres. It 
will undergo a distinctive change of appearance from one end of the 
block to the other. The fixed stars are comparable to such a fence 
and the revolution of the earth around the sun comparable to your 
journey past the picket fence. This made it seem ludicrous to believe 
that the earth had an orbit around the sun as large as Kepler and 
Copernicus attributed to it. This could only be so if the distailce to 
the fixed stars was so enormous as to be merely arithmetically 
conceivable. The distance involved staggers the imagination. The 
enormously large and the incredibly small still boggle our minds. 
Most of us just accept the authority of scientists when they tell us 
about things with diameters so small that such a bit of reality stands 
to a grain of sand as such a grain of sand stands to the solar system, 
or even to the galaxy. It could easily have been unreasonable to 
accept a theory such as Aristarchus's or Copernicus's without being 
offered a powerful explanation of the apparent evidence against 
their views. This is enough to justify saying, as I want to say, that 
it was justifiable to deny truths and that it was justifiable to assert 
falsehoods. The very large has pretty well got itself accepted in 
modem thought. But the very small is still a topic of intense 
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controversy. There are respected philosophers of science (such as 
Bas van Fraassen at Princeton University) who maintain that the 
objects of micro-physics do not actually exist. The ideas of them are 
just useful instruments in methods of predicting what goes on 
among larger-scale, more directly observable objects. 
It is quite impossible to write the history of science in any 
illuminating way if these points about rational false belief and 
irrational true belief are not recognized. Even the new discipline 
called Sociology of Knowledge wants to ask not only why false 
beliefs were so long sustained and give answers in terms of non-
scientific interests that influenced people; that investigation also 
seeks answers to questions about why truths were discovered or 
accepted when they were. For example, I have been told that in 
Germany after the First World War, the indeterminacy involved in 
quantum mechanics appealed to many scientists because of the 
poignancy of the question 'How could Germany have lost the war?' 
There was no doubt solace in the thought that some things happen 
at random and can't be fully explained. There is no plausible way to 
connect the very small things of modern physics with larger things 
like tanks, bullets, or crushed and bleeding bodies; or the very 
short-term events of micro-physics with longer term events such as 
invasions and diplomatic meetings. But this fact about Germany at 
the time may still be significant in relation to the question of why a 
theory was attractive to some people. 
But there is a stock (and vital) distinction between the existence 
of interests which explain people believing certain things because 
those interests and cares make the beliefs attractive; and things that 
relate to whether the beliefs are true or likely to be true. I doubt if 
any of the German scientists alluded to above would ever have 
argued (in, say, one of the scientific journals of the day) that 
Germany's loss of the war was an empirical confirmation of 
quantum mechanics. But in the case of the stellar parallax, the 
unchanging appearance of the stars throughout the year was 
evidence against Copernicus. Take a quite different case: we are 
unsurprised that the Pope believes that God exists. But even he, 
especially since the current one was trained in philosophy, would 
ha.rd1y argue like t..his: 'I am the Pope, dlerefore God exists', or like 
this: 'The fact that I am Pope increases the likelihood that God 
exists'. We certainly expect the Pope to believe in God. That a man 
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is Pope is a reason to believe that he believes. But it is not reason to 
believe what he believes. I expect the Pope knows that. 
In discussing these examples, I have used the word 'true' in its 
everyday way. That way could be called absolute; for the word 
itself repudiates truforist relativism just in the way it is used. So one 
could say that truth is just plain truth and no more needs to be said. 
Nothing is to be gained by adding 'absolute'. Indeed, it concedes to 
the opposition that there may be some point in speaking of relative 
truth, or something in the idea. But I must admit that there is 
something; which is to say that my diagnosis isn't yet complete. 
In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, those philosophers 
called 'Rationalists' spoke of ideas ranging from being obscure 
through clear and distinct to what they called adequate. Their 
thought was that a circumstance, object or property of the world 
could be represented in thought or experience more or less 
adequately. For instance, feeling a pain in your foot is, according to 
them, a very obscure thought of the pebble in your shoe digging 
into the sole of your foot; or, to be grisly, when George Gershwin 
experienced the odour of burning rubber in the absence of burning 
rubber, he was having an obscure thought of his brain tumour. Or, 
if an eagle flies above at great speed, and I am without my glasses, 
I may see only a blur while my binocular equipped and orni-
thologically expert companion will see the glorious flight of an 
eagle. In such cases, we have different conceptions or ideas of just 
the same bit of reality. This is a very intriguing way to think. 
Spinoza, one of the three great Rationalist thinkers, was a precursor 
of writers on religion who interpret the ideas of traditional religion 
as seeing through a glass darkly what the more enlightened can see 
clearly. Karl Marx's idea of religion as the opium of the people and 
the heart of a heartless world is, in its way, a thought of this kind, 
though since it is metaphorical, it is hardly what a Rationalist would 
have called adequate. 
Hegel, about whom I speak with trepidation, apparently 
thought that religion and art could produce conceptions about life 
and reality that would fall short of the conceptions of these things 
tllat philosophy-hJs philosophy anyway--could produce. But 
religious and artistic productions would express the same basic 
truths. He called the ideas, as philosophy would produce them, the 
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absolute truth. There certainly seems to be a parallel between his 
notion of the Absolute and the Rationalist notion of the Adequate (I 
give these mighty notions the dignity of capital letters). 
Along such lines, we are able to make some sense out of the 
notion that what we now believe or know may in some way be 
inadequate or incomplete. But it is little solace for truforist rela-
tivism, except the sort that a diagnosis is for an illness. For these, I 
admit, intriguing and attractive, ways of thinking about our thinking 
do not in anyway threaten plain truth. For at bottom, no more (and 
no less) is involved than is also involved in the fact that 'the very 
large city on the east coast of Australia' may register someone 
having spotted that bit of the world which is more commonly 
registered by 'Sydney'. We may identify and describe something 
from different points of view. 'Point of view' here may be literal or 
figurative. A painter and mechanic opening the bonnet of a Porsche 
see the same thing. But their representation of it may be different 
indeed; that means no more (and no less) than that their interests in 
it may be radically different The Rationalist notion of a range from 
obscure to adequate, then, cannot justify any relativism. It presup-
poses a way things are which can be better or worse represented by 
our thought. It takes for granted just the sort of objectivity we 
began by noticing. 
The Rationalist way of thinking leads to many intriguing 
claims. I have already mentioned Marx's view of religion as 
consolation in the face of suffering. There is also the Freudian view 
that belief in God is obscure appreciation of the power of one's 
father. And there is the Durkheimian view that belief in God is 
obscure recognition and appreciation of our dependency on the 
social order. Such views seek to explain religious belief and its 
tenacity despite its literal content being false, or, in properly 
Spinozan terms, grossly inadequate but still onto something. 
Whatever the effectiveness of this diagnostic approach to the facts 
of religious belief-and my own guess is that religious thought may 
be more sui generis than any of these classical diagnoses allows--
there is no help for truforism here. My point has been that some 
such notion of adequate, or ultimate, or absolute if you like, truth as 
opposed to obscure truth, as a part of our general intellectual 
apparatus, may help with the sympathy and concern we ought to 
have for the uprooted peoples for whom we have acquired many 
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grave responsibilities. 
Recall that I am trying to salvage a conception of independent 
reality without indulging in a God's-eye view. One might even say 
I am trying to put more adequately what the idea of a God's-eye 
view expresses obscurely. I am, in effect, offering some ideas 
toward a theory of error. So far the examples used have been from 
our own history and culture. In order to address the question of 
other contemporary cultures I shall borrow from the anthropologist, 
Robin Horton. 4 Horton belongs to the so-called Intellectualist camp 
in theoretical anthropology. He rejects the view that the fundamental 
thinking processes of the peoples he has studied are different from 
ours. They are significantly different and I will say how he thinks 
they are different. But, for Horton, the difference is not a matter of 
basic ways of thinking or a matter of (whatever that would be) their 
possessing a 'different logic'. I will not, for lack of space, say any 
more about the opposing camps in theoretical anthropology on this 
matter. The issue for all camps is the problem of making sense out 
of the wildly false propositions that traditional people seem to 
assert, and assert readily and often. They say a lot of utterly 
bewildering things. These peoples have cosmologies, large-scale 
views of how the world works and the place of human beings in it. 
Robin Horton believes that they arrive at their cosmologies in 
essentially the same way our science arrives at theories, of either the 
very large or the very small, by hypothetico-deductive reasoning 
and by analogy with the middle-sized. Unobservable things are 
postulated to explain what we do observe. Horton thinks this 
practice is universal. Such postulations get more or less confirm-
ation from observations made as a result of expectations deduced 
from the postulations and other accepted beliefs. What is different is 
the content, not the form, of this approach. Horton, with many 
philosophers of science, holds that models of the unobservable are 
developed by analogy with things and processes that are observ-
able. Here it is useful to think of those lectures on television (or in 
school) where ping-pong balls are made to bounce with increasing 
speed in moving cages. We are then invited to develop our 
understanding of water reaching boiling point on analogy with this 
process and these things. Most of us will recall the striking 
4See Robin Horton, 'African Traditional Thought and Western Science', 
Rationality, ed. Brian Wilson, Oxford, 1970, 131-71. 
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similarity between models of the atom and its nucleus and the solar 
system. I remember being led into the wildest thoughts on that 
occasion, such as why couldn't our entire solar system be an atom 
in someone's baseball bat, about to be bashed by contact with a ball 
in some game going on in a larger and inaccessible reality? 
Analogies and models have played a vital role in the 
development of our scientific theories. Of course, mathematics, 
with its army of equations and algorithms eventually takes over 
from the models; and the models come to be seen as stages on the 
way. This process is well suited to description in terms of the 
movement of thought from obscure through clear to adequate ideas 
which I have just been explaining. Let me say some more about the 
detail of Robin Horton's proposals in this area. 
Horton adopts Bertrand Russell's idea of 'stone-age meta-
physics'. In everyday life, among all peoples on earth, there are 
two dimensions to thinking and acting. First, everybody knows that 
if it's sharper it will cut easier; if it's heavier, you have to push or 
pull harder to move it; if it has a hole in it, it won't float; if it's 
coming at you, you'd better step aside; if you stab him he will 
bleed, etc. The second dimension of stone-age metaphysics 
involves noticing that people make things happen by such actions as 
giving orders, being sources of advice and authority and by 
intentionally moving their limbs or other bodily parts. People do the 
stabbing that makes others bleed and they bend things and break 
them. Their anger and their sadness also generate action (a kind of 
action at a distance) on the part of others; and their generosity, 
kindness or mercifulness produce effects in other people. Summing 
up these features of the two dimensions, they can be called the 
mechanical and the agential, (to coin a word from the term agency). 
All of this, Horton notes, goes on more or less within a range of 
things not much more than a thousand times smaller or larger than 
ourselves and the domain includes other animals as well as human 
beings as agents. But beyond stone-age metaphysics we encounter 
the problems of the very large and the very small. How is concern 
about the effects of these on our lives to take thought in those 
directions? How are we to gain understanding and some measure of 
c.ontrol LI'l the macrocosm a.l'ld t.l}e microcosm? 
According to Horton, we must do this by analogy with 
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something from our stone-age metaphysics. How else to get the 
enterprise off the ground? Horton's idea is that we, especially since 
the seventeenth century-but also in ancient Greece-had the good 
fortune to develop analogies with the mechanical dimension of 
goings-on in the everyday world. The Africans Horton studies on 
the other hand, developed their analogies from the other dimension, 
that in which agency and the powers of persons and social authority 
are salient. Analogy with that dimension was also common in 
European thought right up to the seventeenth century and a good 
deal of it persists in the form of superstition. Horton thinks that we 
got it right and he thinks it undeniable that we got it right. About the 
natural order, as distinct from the social or the cultural order, 
western science has hit on the right path. Horton makes the 
intriguing suggestion, however, that in the understanding of social 
relations and even in the area of psychomatic illness, the Africans 
may have an edge on us. That is, their social psychology may 
actually be, in significant ways, subtler than ours, due to profound 
and long term reflection on the nature of agency and interpersonal 
relations. Assessment of this striking suggestion would depend on 
more knowledge of Horton's field-work than I possess; and it is 
not necessary to what I am concerned with here. 
So here we have an explanation of why people have beliefs 
about spirits and other agencies that account for crop failures, the 
efficacy of weapons, etc. The explanation makes it rational on their 
part to have such beliefs. And our sympathy and concern for them 
need not be diminished if we go on to say that, in such beliefs, they 
are mistaken. 
One may wonder at this point, in relation to the natural order, 
what is so powerful about western science. With many recent 
thinkers on the topic, I would say it is that anyone will 
acknowledge that something has been got right when a way of 
describing things or processes in nature facilitates the reproduction 
of them, from the growing of crops to the splitting of atoms. 
Concomitantly, there is prevention in many cases, and the 
prevention of disease and crop failure is so obviously desirable that 
western technology was bound to make an enormous impact, both 
for good and not so good. Traditional people may have rejected too 
readily some of their own technology. After all, Horton's view 
does not make them ignoramuses in the mechanical dimension of 
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everyday life. Any theory which did would fail to appreciate how 
rich stone-age metaphysics is. These points should not be taken as 
implying that science is interested only in controlling things. That 
would be an insult to the contemplative, wondering strain in the 
lives of thinkers such as Newton, Faraday and Einstein, just to 
mention three. And also an insult to the non-utilitarian curiosity 
about their environment which many traditional peoples exhibit 
Contemplation and wonder need not abate when power comes 
on the scene. The contemplative strand makes no sense at all if a 
scientific theory is just a recipe for manipulation, either of nature or 
of the scientific and broader community. Contemplation makes no 
sense if theories are just tricks by professional scientists to gain 
prestige, authority among graduate students, or government grants. 
The fashionable view of the content of theory as so much steam 
puffing out of the engines of power and prestige must face the 
notoriously embarrassing question: what engine is that view of 
things itself puffing out of! This is not to deny that scientists may 
be corrupt in the ways indicated. Indeed, they may be corrupt and 
produce good theories, though it is to be hoped that this is rare. 
Let us return to the problem of the God's-eye view. We want 
plain truth and independent reality without God. We want a 
conception of how things would be and would have been anyway, 
as it seems useful to put it. That goes with our understanding of 
what knowledge is. 
Let me begin with a model which will work as an analogy. At 
first, it may strike the reader as too much like the earlier example of 
the blind men and the elephant But presently I will say why it is 
different and how that difference is relevant to what I shall call the 
• absolute conception'. The model is one which exploits our 
understanding of perspective in the literal sense of that word and 
then extends the idea. Suppose a cube to be suspended in mid-air, 
with people in all directions and at varying distances from it. 
Suppose the people to be asked to say how things look to them. 
They have not been told in advance what shaped body is there and 
they are asked to say how it looks to them from where they are. It is 
useful to think of CfuTleras stationed at ali the places where people 
are located. The result will be a set of representations. The diversity 
of representations will be large. But on the assumption that there is 
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a cube suspended as it is, all the representations can be ordered into 
a series. And the series will be coherent and consistent. Notice that 
we do not have to think of the assumption that it is a cube that is 
there as coming from outside. One of the participants, or a number 
of them, might very well try that hypothesis. 
We can complicate the model, thus bringing it nearer to the 
actual problem about diversity of thoughts about reality, by thinking 
of the viewers as varying in the excellence of their eyesight. We can 
even suppose some of them to be members of cults that find the 
cube repellent, but the 3-d equivalent of a trapewid divine. We can 
suppose some views to be interfered with by mist or tricky light. 
This will produce a complex diversity within the series of 
representations. And now the task of reconciling the representations 
will have something more like the difficulty the thing it is a model 
for has. This more complicated model helps us to see why we need 
a theory of error. After all, a mere diversity of literally understood 
perspectives is not even a difficulty in principle. Cubes suspended 
in mid-air and seen from different distances and angles had better 
look different. It would be all the participants saying the same thing 
that would be problematic. 
What we are after in these cases is the relating of a lot of 
representations to each other in a way that renders their diversity 
intelligible and explicable. But we have not only the cube but all 
those representations of it to worry about. We do not want to say 
that the representations are somehow outside the world, hanging 
about in some ethereal mind-substance. These representations-we 
might say these representings-are themselves part of the very 
reality we are concerned with. We want to have a conception of 
reality which includes not only what is being represented, the cube, 
but also the episodes in the lives of people which are thoughts of 
representations of the cube. We are, as it were, moving up a level, 
to representations of representations. For what goes on at the first 
level will produce inconsistency. And that is where we need a 
theory of error. After all, even though some of the episodes of 
representation are mistaken, even these will still be occurrences 
within the world. For part of the point I want to make here, let me 
refer again to the English philosopher, Bernard Williams: 
It is an important feature of modem science that it 
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contributes to explaining how creatures with our origins 
and characteristics can understand a world with prperties 
that this same science ascribes to the world. The achieve-
ments of evolutionary biology and the neurological 
sciences are not vacuous.5 
Williams is also my source for the expression 'absolute 
conception' which I introduced a while ago. The idea is maximum 
avoidance of perspective. We can describe a cube as a distribution 
of matter in space-time, and such a description will be unconcerned 
with how the thing looks or how, e.g., its comers would feel to 
any sentient being. And, crucially, this perspective-free description 
will significantly contribute to the explanation of the perspective-
laden occurrences which must also be part of the story. A more 
complete explanation of these perspective-laden facts will contain 
much that is perspectival; for we are dealing with human psycho-
logy, with human society and human language. The absolute 
conception, as Williams offers it to us, does not secure the idea of 
how things would have been anyway for just any way things are. 
There is a long tradition, stemming from the Greeks, recognizing a 
distinction between properties of things such as their size, shape, 
motion and location and, on the other hand, their colour, taste, 
sound and smell. These latter are humanly perspectival. Modem 
science may force us to acknowledge more that is perspectival than 
we would have dreamed of centuries ago. For example, a bowling 
ball, blown up to the size of the earth with its surface unevenness 
kept intact would, I am told, have heights exceeding Everest. And 
that plays hell with words like' smooth' and' rough' . 
So there are nonperspectival and perspectival materials to be 
related to each other. But the fundamental idea is, I hope, clear. Not 
a God's-eye view from somewhere else; rather the exploitation 
within our inquiring activity of those maximally non-perspectival 
materials which modem science has developed, especially the 
disciplines which have been able to use mathematical technique and 
its applications in explanation. 
Because it is we human beings in our humanity which cause 
perspective in the sense of the term we are now using (one which 
5 Williams , 139-40. 
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obviously is a much extended use from that of different perspect-
ives on a cube), the theory of representing that we need will be, in 
large part, a theory about linguistic activity. It seems implausible to 
suppose that theory here will just be a matter of how human bodies 
are stimulated by interrelations to other bodies when the stimuli are 
not conceived of as representations, but as only vocal blasts, noises 
emitted from apertures in human heads. I would myself reject the 
vision of language that goes with much modern materialism, which 
is that of a wheelbarrow for carrying the sands of thought from one 
skull to another; or, to use an image Wittgenstein used to criticize 
this view of language and thought, a drug whose purpose is to get 
you in the same state of mind that I am in. 
The investigation of understanding and representation is, in 
part, investigation of the notion of truth itself, and of the 
problematic notion of meaning, which is probably, though not 
certainly, best elucidated in terms of truth. Such an investigation 
does not belong to the physical sciences. The investigation belongs, 
without at all being in conflict with the study of the human brain, to 
philosophy and to those inquiries that concern themselves with the 
communicative and cultural practices of human beings. 
I would like to give Aristotle, who said truth was when things 
are as you say they are and falsity when they are not, the last word; 
which I invite you to hear as an extended metaphor: 
There must be something which is unmoved outside an 
animal, supported against which the animal which is 
moved moves. For if that which supports the animal is 
always to be giving way (as when tortoises walk on mud 
or men on sand), then there will be no progression-that 
is no stepping forward, if the ground shifts, nor flying 
nor swimming, if the air or the sea should not offer some 
resistance. And that which offers resistance must be 
other than that which is moved, and wholly different 
from the whole of it and what is thus unmoved must be 
no part of what is moved. If not, it will not be moved.6 
6 Aristotle, De Motu Animalium, 698 b15-21, quoted in David Wiggins, 'What 
Would be a Substantial Theory of Truth', Philosophical Subjects: Essays 
Presented to P. F. Strawson, Oxford, 1980, p. 209. 
56 
